O documento é recente, foi desclassificado em 2008 e publicado nesse ano no XVIII volume do dossier Foreign Relations of the United States (Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XVIII) , editado pelo Office of the Historian do Departamento de Estado norte-americano. Parte dos memorandos desse volume recebi-os da Ford Library durante a investigação para o “Portugal Classificado”. Mas memorando da conversa de Ford, Kissinger com Mao só me chegou às depois de o livro ser editado, em Abril de 2008. Daí que tenha escrito, erradamente, que a revolução não chegou à mesa das negociações de Kissinger e Mao. Chegou. A discussão não foi profunda e aconteceu em Pequim dias depois do desfecho, com a vitória dos “moderados”, do 25 de Novembro. Ford alerta que os soviéticos estavam a tentar explorar “algumas fraquezas” em Portugal e na Itália, onde a situação política era mais volátil e existiam partidos comunistas com força.
O comentário de Mao é curto. Perante o resultado do 25 de Novembro em Lisboa e a afirmação de Ford sobre as tentações soviéticas, o líder chinês parece concordar com o presidente norte-americano e diz apenas: “Sim, e agora Portugal parece mais estável. Parece estar melhor.”
(…)
President Ford: How are your relations with Western European
countries, Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Mao: They are better, better than our relations with
President Ford: It’s important that our relations with
as well as yours be good to meet the challenge of any Soviet expansion
in
Chairman Mao: Yes. Yes, and on this we have a common point
there with you. We have no conflict of interests in
President Ford: As a matter of fact, Mr. Chairman, some of us believe
that
strengthening of NATO than some of those countries do for themselves.
Chairman Mao: They are too scattered.
President Ford: Some of them are not as strong and forthright as
they should be.
Chairman Mao: As I see it,
not bad.
bit behind.
President Ford: That’s correct. And the
exploit some weaknesses in
we are trying to do so.
Chairman Mao: Yes, and now
seems to be better.
President Ford: Yes, in the last forty-eight hours it has gotten very
encouraging. The forces we support have moved with great strength
and taken the action that is needed to stabilize the situation.
We agree with you that
its resistance against the
what might happen after Tito.
(…)
Ford leva a conversa para Tito e a Jugoslávia, impressionando uma confissão que fez e o elogio à “força e independência” de Ceausescu na Roménia…
Há meses que Kissinger insistia em explicar a política “forte” dos Estados Unidos quanto à União Soviética. Fê-lo com Qiao Guanhua, ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros chinês, num encontro sem Setembro, em Nova Iorque. “Onde os soviéticos dão sinais de querer expandir-se, nós resistimos.” Mesmo quando enfrenta as críticas tanto interna como externamente. E é o que repete, já em Outubro, em Pequim, quando se encontra com Deng Xiaoping: Evitar “a expansão soviética” mesmo quando os Estados Unidos estão sozinhos a fazê-lo
(…)
Secretary Kissinger: Let me say one thing. Our assessment of Soviet
tendencies does not differ from yours, but our strategic problem
is different than yours.
Your strategic problem is to call the attention to the dangers of this
tendency. Our strategic problem is to be in a position to resist these
tendencies when they occur. To do this we have to demonstrate for our
domestic situation that no other alternative is available.
Therefore we must use language [descriptive] of our relations
[with the
policies in the
the
or foreign criticism.
(…)
Voltemos a 2 de Dezembro. Gerald Ford explica a importância de manter unida e forte o Flanco Sul da Europa (Portugal, Espanha, Grécia, até a Jugoslávia) para conter “quaisquer esforços expansionistas” da União Soviética. De Portugal volta a falar para perguntar por que não aceita a CEE a adesão de Portugal e Espanha. Foi ainda preciso esperar 11 anos e a democratização plena dos dois países ibérios.
(…)
President Ford: We are very concerned about the situation in
as well, Mr. Chairman. The King we do support. We hope he will be
able to handle the elements that would undermine his regime. And we
will work with him in trying to have the necessary control of the situation
during this period of transition.
Chairman Mao: Yes. And anyway we think it would be good if the
European Common Market accepted them. Why doesn’t the EEC want
President Ford: Mr. Chairman, we urged the NATO alliance to be
more friendly to
King that
we feel that the EEC ought to be responsive to movement by the
Spanish Government toward unity with
We will work in both directions as much as we can.
Secretary Kissinger: They are not radical enough for the Europeans.
Chairman Mao: Is that so? Yes, in the past they had fought each
other. Yes, and in the past you did not curse Franco.
President Ford: No. And we support the new King because
the whole southern belly of
strengthened if we are to meet any expansionist efforts by the Soviet
Chairman Mao: Good. Yes, and we think
President Ford: Yes, they went through a difficult time, but the
new government we feel is moving in the right direction and we
will help them. And we hope they will come back as a full partner in
NATO.
(…)
A conversa avança e evolui para os receios de alguns países europeus quanto ao diálogo entre EUA e URSS. O assunto é levantado por Deng. E é nesta parte da conversa que Kissinger interrompe Ford para dizer que os aliados tinham conversações secretas para “coordenar planos” quanto a Espanha, Portugal, Itália e Jugoslávia. O próximo encontro seria na semana seguinte, em Bruxelas, com os ministros dos Negócios Estrangeiros de França, Alemanha, Reino Unido e Itália. Deng dissera o quanto conveniente seria, para a URSS, a “finlandização”. [Definição de José Cutileiro: “durante a Guerra Fria a independência da Finlândia estava limitada por obrigação tácita de defender os interesses de Moscovo”, Expresso, 29 de Dezembro de 2008].
Vice Premier Teng: (…) As I have said to you just
now, the Europeans have worries on two things: that the United
States and the
détente; and they worry they may start deals over their heads.
Second are the domestic problems, and I presume you know there
are the so-called leftist forces. They worry about the strength of the left.
The President: That, of course, was one of the primary reasons for
meeting at Rambouillet. The six countries—four from
our economic plans because if our economic recoveries are not coordinated
or are not moving ahead at a reasonable rate, there is the possibility
that the leftist forces might increase their strength. But it is our
overall view in the
ahead very well, and I believe at Rambouillet there was a consensus—
many of the economic plans were coordinated.
Vice Premier Teng: The problem I have raised just now, perhaps I
can also by way of suggestion say that if the
with the
worried, and if the European countries are under the impression that
they are not in an important position, then the role they may play in
détente with the
will do too much with their relations with the
and these tactics you have mentioned will affect
for the
the European countries one-by-one, to so-called “Finlandize” the countries
of
The President: Mr. Vice Premier, you should have no apprehension
as to our attitude and feeling toward the
of State is meeting regularly with Ministers of four Western European
countries to coordinate our diplomatic and other matters so that
we are working together and we are not, through détente with the Soviet
Secretary Kissinger (interrupting): We meet secretly once a month
to coordinate plans for
we are even making joint plans, for your information, for common
action regarding
spare the feelings of the others. We will meet again next week in
Vice Premier Teng: We are of the view that the top priority is that
the
problem is relatively difficult, because the European countries are many
and their problems are different, and they are not all in agreement.
We have disagreement on the point that the focus of the Soviet
breaks out in
countries in
and
friends from the West, he told them the unification of the two Germanies
is nothing to be feared.
first homeland.
Documentos citados:
Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Reports on USSR,
China, and Middle East Discussions, Box 2, China Memcons and Reports, September 28,
1975, Kissinger’s Meeting with PRC Officials. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only.
Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Reports on USSR,
China, and Middle East Discussions, Box 2, China Memcons and Reports, October 19–23,
1975, Kissinger’s Trip. Top Secret; Nodis.
Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Reports on USSR,
China, and Middle East Discussions, Box 2, China Memcons and Reports, December 1–5,
1975, President Ford’s Visit to Peking. Secret; Nodis.
Foto: Gerald R. Ford Library.
Consultas:
Volume completo Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XVIII:
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/100316.pdf
Capítulo sobre cimeira de Pequim: "The Summit in Beijing, August–December 1975"
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