Friday, December 04, 2009

Pequim, Dezembro 1975 - Mao: “Portugal parece estar mais estável”

O documento é recente, foi desclassificado em 2008 e publicado nesse ano no XVIII volume do dossier Foreign Relations of the United States (Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XVIII) , editado pelo Office of the Historian do Departamento de Estado norte-americano. Parte dos memorandos desse volume recebi-os da Ford Library durante a investigação para o “Portugal Classificado”. Mas memorando da conversa de Ford, Kissinger com Mao só me chegou às depois de o livro ser editado, em Abril de 2008. Daí que tenha escrito, erradamente, que a revolução não chegou à mesa das negociações de Kissinger e Mao. Chegou. A discussão não foi profunda e aconteceu em Pequim dias depois do desfecho, com a vitória dos “moderados”, do 25 de Novembro. Ford alerta que os soviéticos estavam a tentar explorar “algumas fraquezas” em Portugal e na Itália, onde a situação política era mais volátil e existiam partidos comunistas com força.

O comentário de Mao é curto. Perante o resultado do 25 de Novembro em Lisboa e a afirmação de Ford sobre as tentações soviéticas, o líder chinês parece concordar com o presidente norte-americano e diz apenas: “Sim, e agora Portugal parece mais estável. Parece estar melhor.”


President Ford: How are your relations with Western European

countries, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman Mao: They are better, better than our relations with Japan.

President Ford: It’s important that our relations with Western Europe

as well as yours be good to meet the challenge of any Soviet expansion

in Western Europe.

Chairman Mao: Yes. Yes, and on this we have a common point

there with you. We have no conflict of interests in Europe.

President Ford: As a matter of fact, Mr. Chairman, some of us believe

that China does more for Western European unity and the

strengthening of NATO than some of those countries do for themselves.

Chairman Mao: They are too scattered.

President Ford: Some of them are not as strong and forthright as

they should be.

Chairman Mao: As I see it, Sweden is not bad. West Germany is

not bad. Yugoslavia is also good. Holland and Belgium are lagging a

bit behind.

President Ford: That’s correct. And the Soviet Union is seeking to

exploit some weaknesses in Portugal and Italy. We must prevent it, and

we are trying to do so.

Chairman Mao: Yes, and now Portugal seems to be more stable. It

seems to be better.

President Ford: Yes, in the last forty-eight hours it has gotten very

encouraging. The forces we support have moved with great strength

and taken the action that is needed to stabilize the situation.

We agree with you that Yugoslavia is important and is strong in

its resistance against the Soviet Union, but we are concerned about

what might happen after Tito.


Ford leva a conversa para Tito e a Jugoslávia, impressionando uma confissão que fez e o elogio à “força e independência” de Ceausescu na Roménia…

Há meses que Kissinger insistia em explicar a política “forte” dos Estados Unidos quanto à União Soviética. Fê-lo com Qiao Guanhua, ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros chinês, num encontro sem Setembro, em Nova Iorque. “Onde os soviéticos dão sinais de querer expandir-se, nós resistimos.” Mesmo quando enfrenta as críticas tanto interna como externamente. E é o que repete, já em Outubro, em Pequim, quando se encontra com Deng Xiaoping: Evitar “a expansão soviética” mesmo quando os Estados Unidos estão sozinhos a fazê-lo


Secretary Kissinger: Let me say one thing. Our assessment of Soviet

tendencies does not differ from yours, but our strategic problem

is different than yours.

Your strategic problem is to call the attention to the dangers of this

tendency. Our strategic problem is to be in a position to resist these

tendencies when they occur. To do this we have to demonstrate for our

domestic situation that no other alternative is available.

Therefore we must use language [descriptive] of our relations

[with the USSR] which you do not like. But this is the only way for the

United States to pursue a really strong policy. If you observe our actual

policies in the Middle East, Portugal, Angola, or other areas, when

the Soviet Union tries to expand we resist—even in the face of domestic

or foreign criticism.


Voltemos a 2 de Dezembro. Gerald Ford explica a importância de manter unida e forte o Flanco Sul da Europa (Portugal, Espanha, Grécia, até a Jugoslávia) para conter “quaisquer esforços expansionistas” da União Soviética. De Portugal volta a falar para perguntar por que não aceita a CEE a adesão de Portugal e Espanha. Foi ainda preciso esperar 11 anos e a democratização plena dos dois países ibérios.


President Ford: We are very concerned about the situation in Spain

as well, Mr. Chairman. The King we do support. We hope he will be

able to handle the elements that would undermine his regime. And we

will work with him in trying to have the necessary control of the situation

during this period of transition.

Chairman Mao: Yes. And anyway we think it would be good if the

European Common Market accepted them. Why doesn’t the EEC want

Spain and Portugal?

President Ford: Mr. Chairman, we urged the NATO alliance to be

more friendly to Spain even under Franco. And we hope with the new

King that Spain will be more acceptable to the NATO alliance. In addition

we feel that the EEC ought to be responsive to movement by the

Spanish Government toward unity with Western Europe as a whole.

We will work in both directions as much as we can.

Secretary Kissinger: They are not radical enough for the Europeans.

Chairman Mao: Is that so? Yes, in the past they had fought each

other. Yes, and in the past you did not curse Franco.

President Ford: No. And we support the new King because

the whole southern belly of Western Europe must remain strong—

Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Yugoslavia. All that must be

strengthened if we are to meet any expansionist efforts by the Soviet


Chairman Mao: Good. Yes, and we think Greece should get better.

President Ford: Yes, they went through a difficult time, but the

new government we feel is moving in the right direction and we

will help them. And we hope they will come back as a full partner in



A conversa avança e evolui para os receios de alguns países europeus quanto ao diálogo entre EUA e URSS. O assunto é levantado por Deng. E é nesta parte da conversa que Kissinger interrompe Ford para dizer que os aliados tinham conversações secretas para “coordenar planos” quanto a Espanha, Portugal, Itália e Jugoslávia. O próximo encontro seria na semana seguinte, em Bruxelas, com os ministros dos Negócios Estrangeiros de França, Alemanha, Reino Unido e Itália. Deng dissera o quanto conveniente seria, para a URSS, a “finlandização”. [Definição de José Cutileiro: “durante a Guerra Fria a independência da Finlândia estava limitada por obrigação tácita de defender os interesses de Moscovo”, Expresso, 29 de Dezembro de 2008].

Vice Premier Teng: (…) As I have said to you just

now, the Europeans have worries on two things: that the United

States and the Soviet Union are talking too much about so-called

détente; and they worry they may start deals over their heads.

Second are the domestic problems, and I presume you know there

are the so-called leftist forces. They worry about the strength of the left.

The President: That, of course, was one of the primary reasons for

meeting at Rambouillet. The six countries—four from Western Europe,

Japan, and ourselves—met primarily for the purpose of coordinating

our economic plans because if our economic recoveries are not coordinated

or are not moving ahead at a reasonable rate, there is the possibility

that the leftist forces might increase their strength. But it is our

overall view in the United States that economic recovery is moving

ahead very well, and I believe at Rambouillet there was a consensus—

many of the economic plans were coordinated.

Vice Premier Teng: The problem I have raised just now, perhaps I

can also by way of suggestion say that if the United States has such relations

with the Soviet Union that get the Western European countries

worried, and if the European countries are under the impression that

they are not in an important position, then the role they may play in

détente with the Soviet Union may go inappropriately too far or they

will do too much with their relations with the Soviet Union. And the

United States is in an important position politically and economically—

and these tactics you have mentioned will affect Western Europe and

Japan. And this tactic will surely lead to creating a favorable situation

for the Soviet Union. It is favorable for the Soviet Union to disintegrate

the European countries one-by-one, to so-called “Finlandize” the countries

of Western Europe one-by-one.

The President: Mr. Vice Premier, you should have no apprehension

as to our attitude and feeling toward the Soviet Union. The Secretary

of State is meeting regularly with Ministers of four Western European

countries to coordinate our diplomatic and other matters so that

we are working together and we are not, through détente with the Soviet

Union, going to—

Secretary Kissinger (interrupting): We meet secretly once a month

to coordinate plans for Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Yugoslavia—and

we are even making joint plans, for your information, for common

action regarding Yugoslavia. But we don’t announce the meeting to

spare the feelings of the others. We will meet again next week in


Vice Premier Teng: We are of the view that the top priority is that

the United States should pay more attention to Europe, because this

problem is relatively difficult, because the European countries are many

and their problems are different, and they are not all in agreement.

We have disagreement on the point that the focus of the Soviet

Union’s strategy is in Europe. That doesn’t matter, but the fact is the

Soviet Union is paying more attention to the Europeans. In case war

breaks out in Europe, as Chairman Mao mentioned yesterday, several

countries in Europe would fight—West Germany, Yugoslavia, Romania,

and Sweden. And even when our Chairman talked with some

friends from the West, he told them the unification of the two Germanies

is nothing to be feared. Germany, I believe, is Doctor Kissinger’s

first homeland.

Documentos citados:

Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Reports on USSR,
China, and Middle East Discussions, Box 2, China Memcons and Reports, September 28,
1975, Kissinger’s Meeting with PRC Officials. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only.

Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Reports on USSR,
China, and Middle East Discussions, Box 2, China Memcons and Reports, October 19–23,
1975, Kissinger’s Trip. Top Secret; Nodis.

Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Reports on USSR,
China, and Middle East Discussions, Box 2, China Memcons and Reports, December 1–5,
1975, President Ford’s Visit to Peking. Secret; Nodis.

Foto: Gerald R. Ford Library.


Volume completo Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XVIII:

Capítulo sobre cimeira de Pequim: "The Summit in Beijing, August–December 1975"

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