A 10 de Junho de 1975, o consulado norte-americano em Hong Kong fazia uma análise ao(s) interesse(s) da China em Portugal e na Revolução portuguesa, então em fase de efervescência. É o telegrama Hong Kong 06408, enviado para o Departamento de Estado com o carimbo de “Confidencial” e que pode ser consultado no “site” dos National Archives.
Um resumo:
1. Pequim não conseguiu mais do que uma presença “simbólica” em Portugal.
2. O problema de Macau era peça fundamental para Pequim manter o “status quo”, sem dar muito alento aos grupos ou partidos maoístas.
3. Pequim receava as intenções do novo regime, com a influência do PCP pró-Moscovo, quanto a Macau; o consulado admite o cenário de devolução imediata de Macau à China ou, pior ainda, que a União Soviética viesse a ter influência no território – “o que seria intolerável para a República Popular da China. [Recorde-se que o PCP de Álvaro Cunhal alinhara pela URSS no “cisma” sino-soviético].
4. Quanto aos “grupos” ou partidos maoistas em Portugal, a leitura do consulado americanos em Hong Kong é que Pequim tem tentado ignorá-los, dado que há um conflito entre os interesses de uma potência como a China – a favor de um bloco europeu ocidental forte que “trave” a União Soviética – e esses “grupos” maoistas. “As actividades e os programas dos chamados grupos maoistas em Portugal não estão em sintonia com os interesses da China e demonstram a incapacidade de Pequim exercer controlo sobre os grupos que reclamam maoistas”.
Próximo post: as visitas dos grupos maoístas à China.
Telegrama na íntegra:
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 01 HONG K 06408 100142Z
70
ACTION EA-10
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 EUR-12 IO-10 CIAE-00 PM-03 H-02 INR-07
L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06
SAJ-01 SAM-01 /080 W
--------------------- 109430
R 101145Z JUN 75
FM AMCONSUL HONG KONG
TO AMEMBASSY LISBON
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN
USMISSION NATO
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MADRID
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USLO PEKING
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
SECSTATE WASHDC 5357
/DIA WASHDC
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GER
USMISSION USUN
C O N F I D E N T I A L HONG KONG 6408
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR PO CH
SUBJ: CHINESE PRESENCE IN PORTUGAL
REF: LISBON 3162
1. REFTEL DRAWS ATTENTION TO PEKING'S FAILURE TO ESTABLISH
MORE THAN A TOKEN PRESENCE IN PORTUGAL. IT IS TRUE THAT
ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH LISBON WOULD AFFORD
PEKING AN OPPORTUNITY TO ESTABLISH A GREATER PRESENCE IN
PORTUGAL AND TO LODGE ANOTHER BLOW TO TAIWAN EFFORTS TO
REMAIN DIPLOMATICALLY AFLOAT. GIVEN THE CURENT POLITICAL SITUATION
IN LISBON, HOWEVER, PEKING SEES SOME RISKS IN
FORMALIZING TIES WITH LISBON.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 HONG K 06408 100142Z
2. PEKING NOT ONLY IS UNCERTAIN OF LISBON'S INTENTIONS VIS-A-VIS THE
PORTUGUESE ADMINISTERED ENCLAVE OF MACAU, BUT CLEARLY
PREFERS MAINTENCANCE OF THE POLITICAL STATUS QUO IN MACAU.
LISBON, HOWEVER, HAS TENDED TO LINK TALKS LEADING TO DIPLOMATIC
TIES WITH DISCUSSIONS ON THE FUTURE STATUS OF MACAU. CHINA'S
DESIRE TO AVOID HAVING THE SUBJECT OF MACAU'S FUTURE BROUGHT
IN TO QUESTION AT THIS PARTICULAR TIME IN LARGE PART ACCOUNTS
FOR PEKING'S KPUBLIC) UNRESPONSIVENESS TO ANY LISBON OVERTURE.
3. MOREOVER, GIVEN THE INCREASED INFLUENCE OF THE PRO-MOSCOW
COMMUNIST PARTY IN PORTUGAL, MOVES TOWARD ESTABLISHMENT OF
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS COULD HAVE UNFAVORABLE REPRECUSSIONS
ON PRC INTERESTS IN ASIA. THE CHINESE PROBABLY ARE CONCERNED
LEST THE PRO-SOVIET INFLUENCE IN PORTUGAL RESULTS IN LISBON'S
ATTEMPTING TO EMBARRASS THE PRC OR IMPEL PEKING TO REASSERT
ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OVER MACAU (E.G., IN SPITE OF PRC
PROTESTATIONS , LISBON COULD UNILATERALLY RETURN MACAU TO PRC
AUTHORITIES OR APPROVE A SOVIET PRESENCE IN MACAU, THE LATTER
BEING INTOLERABLE TO THE PRC.)
4. AS TO RELATIONS WITH PRO-CHINA COMMUNIST PARTIES, PEKING
HAS TENDED TO BE HIGHLY SELECTIVE IN EXTENDING IT SUPPORT
AND ASSISTANCE TO SELF-STYLED "MAOIST" GROUPS. WHEN ACTIONS
OR INTERESTS OF SUCH GROUPS RUN COUNTER TO PRC INTEREST, CHINA
HAS BEEN KNOWN TO REPUDIATE OR IGNORE SUCH GROUPS. PEKING
FAVORS A POLITICALLY STAGLE AND UNIFIED WESTERN EUROPE AND
LOOKS UPON INSTANCES OF POLITICAL I STABILITY AS PROVIDING
OPPORTUNITIES FOR FURTHER SOVIET INROADS. THUS, THE ACTIVITIES
AND PROGRAMS OF THE SO-CALLED MAOIST GROUPS IN PORTUGAL DO
NOT ACCORD WITH PRC INTERESTS AND ARE INDICATIVE OF PEKING'S
INABILITY TO EXERCISE CONTROL OVER GROUPS WHICH MAY
CLAIM TO ESPOUSE MAOIST CONCEPTS.
CROSS
Um resumo:
1. Pequim não conseguiu mais do que uma presença “simbólica” em Portugal.
2. O problema de Macau era peça fundamental para Pequim manter o “status quo”, sem dar muito alento aos grupos ou partidos maoístas.
3. Pequim receava as intenções do novo regime, com a influência do PCP pró-Moscovo, quanto a Macau; o consulado admite o cenário de devolução imediata de Macau à China ou, pior ainda, que a União Soviética viesse a ter influência no território – “o que seria intolerável para a República Popular da China. [Recorde-se que o PCP de Álvaro Cunhal alinhara pela URSS no “cisma” sino-soviético].
4. Quanto aos “grupos” ou partidos maoistas em Portugal, a leitura do consulado americanos em Hong Kong é que Pequim tem tentado ignorá-los, dado que há um conflito entre os interesses de uma potência como a China – a favor de um bloco europeu ocidental forte que “trave” a União Soviética – e esses “grupos” maoistas. “As actividades e os programas dos chamados grupos maoistas em Portugal não estão em sintonia com os interesses da China e demonstram a incapacidade de Pequim exercer controlo sobre os grupos que reclamam maoistas”.
Próximo post: as visitas dos grupos maoístas à China.
Telegrama na íntegra:
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 01 HONG K 06408 100142Z
70
ACTION EA-10
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 EUR-12 IO-10 CIAE-00 PM-03 H-02 INR-07
L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06
SAJ-01 SAM-01 /080 W
--------------------- 109430
R 101145Z JUN 75
FM AMCONSUL HONG KONG
TO AMEMBASSY LISBON
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN
USMISSION NATO
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MADRID
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USLO PEKING
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
SECSTATE WASHDC 5357
/DIA WASHDC
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GER
USMISSION USUN
C O N F I D E N T I A L HONG KONG 6408
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR PO CH
SUBJ: CHINESE PRESENCE IN PORTUGAL
REF: LISBON 3162
1. REFTEL DRAWS ATTENTION TO PEKING'S FAILURE TO ESTABLISH
MORE THAN A TOKEN PRESENCE IN PORTUGAL. IT IS TRUE THAT
ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH LISBON WOULD AFFORD
PEKING AN OPPORTUNITY TO ESTABLISH A GREATER PRESENCE IN
PORTUGAL AND TO LODGE ANOTHER BLOW TO TAIWAN EFFORTS TO
REMAIN DIPLOMATICALLY AFLOAT. GIVEN THE CURENT POLITICAL SITUATION
IN LISBON, HOWEVER, PEKING SEES SOME RISKS IN
FORMALIZING TIES WITH LISBON.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 HONG K 06408 100142Z
2. PEKING NOT ONLY IS UNCERTAIN OF LISBON'S INTENTIONS VIS-A-VIS THE
PORTUGUESE ADMINISTERED ENCLAVE OF MACAU, BUT CLEARLY
PREFERS MAINTENCANCE OF THE POLITICAL STATUS QUO IN MACAU.
LISBON, HOWEVER, HAS TENDED TO LINK TALKS LEADING TO DIPLOMATIC
TIES WITH DISCUSSIONS ON THE FUTURE STATUS OF MACAU. CHINA'S
DESIRE TO AVOID HAVING THE SUBJECT OF MACAU'S FUTURE BROUGHT
IN TO QUESTION AT THIS PARTICULAR TIME IN LARGE PART ACCOUNTS
FOR PEKING'S KPUBLIC) UNRESPONSIVENESS TO ANY LISBON OVERTURE.
3. MOREOVER, GIVEN THE INCREASED INFLUENCE OF THE PRO-MOSCOW
COMMUNIST PARTY IN PORTUGAL, MOVES TOWARD ESTABLISHMENT OF
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS COULD HAVE UNFAVORABLE REPRECUSSIONS
ON PRC INTERESTS IN ASIA. THE CHINESE PROBABLY ARE CONCERNED
LEST THE PRO-SOVIET INFLUENCE IN PORTUGAL RESULTS IN LISBON'S
ATTEMPTING TO EMBARRASS THE PRC OR IMPEL PEKING TO REASSERT
ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OVER MACAU (E.G., IN SPITE OF PRC
PROTESTATIONS , LISBON COULD UNILATERALLY RETURN MACAU TO PRC
AUTHORITIES OR APPROVE A SOVIET PRESENCE IN MACAU, THE LATTER
BEING INTOLERABLE TO THE PRC.)
4. AS TO RELATIONS WITH PRO-CHINA COMMUNIST PARTIES, PEKING
HAS TENDED TO BE HIGHLY SELECTIVE IN EXTENDING IT SUPPORT
AND ASSISTANCE TO SELF-STYLED "MAOIST" GROUPS. WHEN ACTIONS
OR INTERESTS OF SUCH GROUPS RUN COUNTER TO PRC INTEREST, CHINA
HAS BEEN KNOWN TO REPUDIATE OR IGNORE SUCH GROUPS. PEKING
FAVORS A POLITICALLY STAGLE AND UNIFIED WESTERN EUROPE AND
LOOKS UPON INSTANCES OF POLITICAL I STABILITY AS PROVIDING
OPPORTUNITIES FOR FURTHER SOVIET INROADS. THUS, THE ACTIVITIES
AND PROGRAMS OF THE SO-CALLED MAOIST GROUPS IN PORTUGAL DO
NOT ACCORD WITH PRC INTERESTS AND ARE INDICATIVE OF PEKING'S
INABILITY TO EXERCISE CONTROL OVER GROUPS WHICH MAY
CLAIM TO ESPOUSE MAOIST CONCEPTS.
CROSS
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