Monday, January 28, 2013
25 de Abril e a ilusão da esquerda (EDIÇÃO REVISTA E AUMENTADA)
Imagem do regresso de Cunhal a Portugal em 1974, o tal momento que para uns foi encenado, a exemplo de Lenine, e para outros um mero acaso. Um deles é Jaime Neves, militar que enfileirou na direita, e explicou, numa entrevista ao António Ribeiro Ferreira, no CM, que ele próprio sugeriu a Cunhal que subisse ao blindado para melhor ser ouvido. Na foto, vêem-se Mário Soares, Dias Lourenço.
(Foi o que escrevi em 2008. Jaime Neves pode ser identificado no canto superior direito. Ironia das ironias: ele, que combateu sem quartéis o PCP e Cunhal, foi ele a fazer a "escolta" no regresso do velho senhor a Portugal após o 25 de Abril)
Friday, January 18, 2013
Fotos do "companheiro Vasco" com o "inimigo" em 1975 (3)
Ainda mais fotos de Vasco Gonçalves com Gerald Ford. Agora em versão sorridente!
Podem ser consultadas na Gerald Ford Library
Podem ser consultadas na Gerald Ford Library
Fotos do "companheiro Vasco" com o "inimigo" em 1975 (2)
Mais fotos de Vasco Gonçalves com o Gerald Ford e Henry Kissinger, em 1975.
Podem ser consultadas na Gerald Ford Library
Podem ser consultadas na Gerald Ford Library
Saturday, January 12, 2013
O interesse da URSS por Portugal pelos "óculos" dos EUA
A avaliação é da Embaixada dos Estados Unidos em Moscovo sobre o(s) interesse(s) dos soviéticos em Portugal e na revolução e na Espanha de Franco. Por outras palavras, o interesse da URSS por Portugal visto pelos óculos dos EUA.
O telegrama, confidencial, é de 25 de outubro de 1975. Por
essa altura, já tinha caído Vasco Gonçalves, o primeiro-ministro que Washington
ajudou ativamente a apear do poder, e Pinheiro de Azevedo era o novo inquilino
de São Bento. O outono tinha chegado, mas a temperatura política em Portugal
continuava alta. A revolução estava na rua.
Jack Matlock, número dois da embaixada dos EUA em Moscovo e um
especialista em assuntos soviéticos, começa por dizer que Portugal, na “perspetiva
tradicional dos soviéticos”, é “pouco mais do que um apêndice” da Espanha na
Península Ibérica… E diz que os soviéticos não acreditavam que os comunistas
conquistassem o poder em Lisboa.
Matlock acreditava, isso sim, que o líder soviético, Leonid
Brejnev, olharia uma vitória dos comunistas em Lisboa como uma fonte de
problemas da União Soviética com o Ocidente em tempo de Guerra Fria e
“deténte”. E que um Governo comunista em Portugal duraria pouco tempo. A
começar pelo facto de o país não ser “uma ilha”, como Cuba, e estar rodeado
“por três lados” pela Espanha, governada pelo ditador Francisco Franco. Além do
mais, segundo o diplomata, os soviéticos duvidavam da capacidade do PCP de
Álvaro Cunhal conquistar o poder em Lisboa.
E o Kremlin também não acreditava que o Ocidente, e em especial
os EUA, deixasse que Portugal “se juntasse ao campo soviético”. “É inconcebível
para a liderança soviética” que esse cenário se concretizasse, concluiu o diplomata.
Mais ainda. Em termos estratégicos, um Governo “vermelho” em
Lisboa levaria Espanha – ainda governada por Franco – a “virar à direita”(!) e
a afastar-se da Europa.
Do ponto de vista soviético, “seria muito pior ganhar
[Portugal] e depois perder, ‘à la Chile´, do que ser derrotado”.
Na avaliação de Matlock, os soviéticos achavam que “Cunhal
exagerou”: “Teve a vantagem de ter um partido disciplinado, um
primeiro-ministro maleável, e uma situação política confusa, mas pressionou
demais e perdeu uma parte essencial dos militares e dos socialistas.”
Por outras palavras, e com base numa análise de imprensa
sobre a situação portuguesa, a embaixada dos EUA acreditava que “o conselho do
Kremlin a Cunhal tenha sido” manter-se na retaguarda e cultivar as relações com
os militares do MFA. Objetivo? “Que o erro de Allende não se repita em Lisboa”.
Ou seja, evitar o esmagamento de um Governo comunista por um movimento militar
de direita, como Pinochet fez com Allende.
Com os comunistas no Governo – mesmo num executivo
“unitário” – os soviéticos podiam “por e dispor”, na leitura de Matlock. “Podem recuperar da ‘lição do Chile’,
continuar em Portugal a espiar um Governo da NATO com participação portuguesa:
tudo sem prejudicar a ‘detente’ e, por isso, a ‘europeização’ de Espanha. Brejnev
terá dito Costa Gomes: “não conheço esse cavalheiro”. Apesar da atitude hipócrita,
acreditamos que os soviéticos estão confortáveis com a situação [em Portugal]: vão
ajudando clandestinamente o PCP com dinheiro, enquanto alegam que estão “limpos”
e têm uma política de não-ingerência”.
Thursday, January 10, 2013
Fotos do "companheiro Vasco" com o "inimigo" em 1975
Em 2004, na altura em que publiquei no DN um trabalho sobre a primeira e única reunião entre o primeiro-ministro, Vasco Gonçalves, e o presidente norte-americano, Gerald Ford, à margem de uma reunião da NATO, na Bélgica, em Maio de 1975, eu e o editor, o João Morgado Fernandes, só conseguimos uma foto do encontro. Foi essa que "entrou em página".
Passados quase dez anos, encontrei na Ford Library "contact sheets" de fotos desse encontro. São momentos históricos.
Há fotos de Ford e Henry Kissinger, o secretário de Estado norte-americano, de pé, à espera do "companheiro Vasco". Depois, vê-se Rosa Coutinho, o "almirante vermelho", com um sorriso (!), a cumprimentar Ford. Um fotograma à frente está um menos sorridente Vasco a saudar Ford.
No fotograma 14, vê-se Kissinger com a mão na cabeça. Ele que se queixou de ter levado uma lição sobre governação do Vasco Gonçalves. O homem forte da diplomacia norte-americana diria mais tarde que Gonçalves era comunista. A única dúvida que tinha era se o senhor pagava ou não as quota ao PCP...
(a foto pode ser encontrada no arquivo on-line da Ford Library)
A 16 de maio de 2008, publiquei o seguinte neste blogue:
Um documento da Ford Library
Um exemplo de documento da Ford Library.
No caso é um memorando de uma reunião do gabinete de Ford, na Casa
Branca, a 4 de Junho de 1975, após uma visita do presidente
norte-americano à Europa e uma cimeira da NATO, em Bruxelas, durante a
qual se reuniu com o primeiro-ministro português, general Vasco
Gonçalves.
Esta reunião de Ford, Kissinger com Vasco Gonçalves - cujo memorando não está "on-line" - serviu de base a um capítulo do livro: "Diálogo de surdos em Bruxelas – O frente-a-frente de Vasco Gonçalves com Ford e Kissinger".
Esta reunião de Ford, Kissinger com Vasco Gonçalves - cujo memorando não está "on-line" - serviu de base a um capítulo do livro: "Diálogo de surdos em Bruxelas – O frente-a-frente de Vasco Gonçalves com Ford e Kissinger".
De
regresso a Washington, foi nesta reunião que Kissinger afirmou que o
governo português poderia estar a fazer o jogo dos soviéticos.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6
MR 95-83, #24, NSC ltr 6/25/96
By let, NARA, Date 1/16/97
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Notes of the Cabinet Meeting June 4th, 1975 - 2:00 p.m.
The President entered the Cabinet Room at 2:10 p.m.
The Press entered at 2:12 p.m.; departed at 2:15 p.m.
The President opened the meeting and thanked the members of the Cabinet and staff for the warm welcome. He indicated that a major vote had just taken place and that the Administration sustained the veto on the Jobs Bill by a vote of 277 to 145. He mentioned that one week to ten days ago, the Administration could not have sustained the veto. The message the President gave to the Republicans was that if Republicans could not hold the line on this one, it would open the flood gate. The President was generous in his praise for everyone, specifically naming (for their testimony) Weinberger, Morton, and Zarb; and for the Congressional effort, Jack Marsh and Max Friedersdorf. The President added that he believed this was a significant victory, a major victory, and perhaps the most important vote for the Administration since he has been President.
The President then began his discussion of foreign policy, indicating that he left with hopes and returned with no regrets. That in discussing that which had transpired in Europe on the return flight, the feeling was that they were very satisfied; it was a successful trip and they made all of the headway they had hoped to make. The President believed the meeting with NATO was important for several reasons: 1) To strengthen the Alliance, 2) To indicate his personal interest in and maintenance of European relationships; and 3) Also, to serve notice that the Alliance needs to recognize Spain as a part of NATO for the defense of Europe. The United States has an arrangement with Spain, which adds to the total defense of Europe.
Historically, the European Community has not welcomed Spain because of its dictatorship and support of the German Empire during World War II.
The President's discussion with the Prime Minister of Portugal was cordial. The United States was very firm and blunt in its discussion with him. The United States indicated to the Prime Minister that it sees many deficiencies in its present Government. In fact, the President asked him to de-
PAGE 2
scribe his system of Government and it took the Prime Minister some twenty minutes just to tell the President how his Government makes decisions. It was suggested that the system was a bit chaotic. The President indicated that he believed there could not be a double standard, one for Spain and one for Portugal, in the United States' relationship with the two countries. Therefore, it was important that the United States maintains an interest in, and be candid with Portugal.
In Spain the President's efforts concentrated on the military situation and the maintenance of the United States air bases there. It is important to Western Europe to have the Mediterranean area secure and United States bases in Spain add to that security. The President was warmly received in Spain and there were huge crowds on his motorcade route.
In Austria the President indicated he tumbled into Austria, but that he really felt that Betty had tripped him, then ran away and left him to get to his feet all by himself. He indicated that the meeting with Sadat was excellent and the personal rapport between the two leaders is very good. He did indicate to Sadat that the United States was continuing its reassessment of the Middle East and that the United States wants to explore all facts, options, and possibilities. The President feels there are three choices to be made: 1) Resume step-by step diplomacy, 2) Develop a comprehensive settlement, which would raise serious problems with final frontiers, and 3) Specific bilateral agreements within the parameters of the comprehensive plan. The President indicated to Sadat that all of those would be taken into consideration during the reassessment.
In Rome the President discussed the entire underside or belly of NATO, the Mediterranean area, Portugal, Turkey, Greece, Spain, and all of the problems related to that. He believes the Italians are making good progress on the economic front and while it is not decisive yet, there is a feeling that the Italians are doing a good job. The President said he was very impressed with the people he met in the Government, specifically citing Leone and Moro as being very sharp. He was cordially received and the discussions were very fruitful.
The President mentioned that he had a very impressive audience with the Pope. He had been told the Pope was very sick, however, he appeared to be well, giving the President a good handshake and speaking in a very strong voice. He covered a wide range of topics in a long meeting. He was impressed with the Pope and with the reception at the Vatican.
PAGE 3
The President in summing up his trip to Europe, said the total trip signifies the forward movement and momentum of American foreign policy. In spite of the problems with Vietnam and all of Southeast Asia, the United States will stand firmly by its Allies; it will maintain its commitments, and American foreign policy will be strong and bold in future years.
The President then asked Henry if he cared to make any comments.
Secretary Kissinger said that when the United States first proposed a NATO Meeting, the Allies were not enthusiastic about it. It came at a very difficult time for the United States and no one in NATO was particularly excited about having a meeting.
There was a discussion as to whether or not the United States should take new and creative measures, even some gimmickry in getting this group together. The final decision was made by the President, when he said he wanted to have a straight forward meeting with NATO with no ploy or gimmicks. Secretary Kissinger's belief was that the major point the President made at NATO is that the U. S. is back in business. The United States knew what it was doing, had a firm commitment, and showed clear direction in its discussion with other countries.
An example of the kind of impression left was best summed up by Prime Minister Trudeau of Canada. Trudeau told others at one of the closing sessions, that the meeting was so good and so beneficial, that it should be institutionalized. He indicated that NATO should cover the entire agenda of issues before world countries as opposed to just defense. Since Canada has been a rather reluctant partner in NATO from time to time, it is interesting that he should be so enthusiastic.
The Secretary noted that the framework was created at Brussels for a good discussion with regard to Turkey and Greece. The real cog seems to be who will put forth the first proposition, since it will then seem that party is making the concession. So the policy seems to be at a point where one country or the other will put forth a major proposal.
The Secretary said that the only political party in Portugal is the military. The others for all intents and purposes were dead. His basic question about Portugal is why do they stay in NATO, and there seems to be two answers: 1) Because the public is not ready to accept the fact that they might pull out, and 2) Perhaps they are staying in to serve the Communist purpose.
PAGE 4
The big problem in Spain, of course, is how influential can the United States be in keeping Spain from going like Portugal when Franco dies. Therefore, the President met with Franco, as well as Juan Carlos and Arias to be certain the United States was clearly identified with the transitional power and the succession of Franco. (...)
Cabinet Meeting Minutes, 6/4/75, Box 4, James E. Connor Files, Gerald R. Ford Library.
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6
MR 95-83, #24, NSC ltr 6/25/96
By let, NARA, Date 1/16/97
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Notes of the Cabinet Meeting June 4th, 1975 - 2:00 p.m.
The President entered the Cabinet Room at 2:10 p.m.
The Press entered at 2:12 p.m.; departed at 2:15 p.m.
The President opened the meeting and thanked the members of the Cabinet and staff for the warm welcome. He indicated that a major vote had just taken place and that the Administration sustained the veto on the Jobs Bill by a vote of 277 to 145. He mentioned that one week to ten days ago, the Administration could not have sustained the veto. The message the President gave to the Republicans was that if Republicans could not hold the line on this one, it would open the flood gate. The President was generous in his praise for everyone, specifically naming (for their testimony) Weinberger, Morton, and Zarb; and for the Congressional effort, Jack Marsh and Max Friedersdorf. The President added that he believed this was a significant victory, a major victory, and perhaps the most important vote for the Administration since he has been President.
The President then began his discussion of foreign policy, indicating that he left with hopes and returned with no regrets. That in discussing that which had transpired in Europe on the return flight, the feeling was that they were very satisfied; it was a successful trip and they made all of the headway they had hoped to make. The President believed the meeting with NATO was important for several reasons: 1) To strengthen the Alliance, 2) To indicate his personal interest in and maintenance of European relationships; and 3) Also, to serve notice that the Alliance needs to recognize Spain as a part of NATO for the defense of Europe. The United States has an arrangement with Spain, which adds to the total defense of Europe.
Historically, the European Community has not welcomed Spain because of its dictatorship and support of the German Empire during World War II.
The President's discussion with the Prime Minister of Portugal was cordial. The United States was very firm and blunt in its discussion with him. The United States indicated to the Prime Minister that it sees many deficiencies in its present Government. In fact, the President asked him to de-
PAGE 2
scribe his system of Government and it took the Prime Minister some twenty minutes just to tell the President how his Government makes decisions. It was suggested that the system was a bit chaotic. The President indicated that he believed there could not be a double standard, one for Spain and one for Portugal, in the United States' relationship with the two countries. Therefore, it was important that the United States maintains an interest in, and be candid with Portugal.
In Spain the President's efforts concentrated on the military situation and the maintenance of the United States air bases there. It is important to Western Europe to have the Mediterranean area secure and United States bases in Spain add to that security. The President was warmly received in Spain and there were huge crowds on his motorcade route.
In Austria the President indicated he tumbled into Austria, but that he really felt that Betty had tripped him, then ran away and left him to get to his feet all by himself. He indicated that the meeting with Sadat was excellent and the personal rapport between the two leaders is very good. He did indicate to Sadat that the United States was continuing its reassessment of the Middle East and that the United States wants to explore all facts, options, and possibilities. The President feels there are three choices to be made: 1) Resume step-by step diplomacy, 2) Develop a comprehensive settlement, which would raise serious problems with final frontiers, and 3) Specific bilateral agreements within the parameters of the comprehensive plan. The President indicated to Sadat that all of those would be taken into consideration during the reassessment.
In Rome the President discussed the entire underside or belly of NATO, the Mediterranean area, Portugal, Turkey, Greece, Spain, and all of the problems related to that. He believes the Italians are making good progress on the economic front and while it is not decisive yet, there is a feeling that the Italians are doing a good job. The President said he was very impressed with the people he met in the Government, specifically citing Leone and Moro as being very sharp. He was cordially received and the discussions were very fruitful.
The President mentioned that he had a very impressive audience with the Pope. He had been told the Pope was very sick, however, he appeared to be well, giving the President a good handshake and speaking in a very strong voice. He covered a wide range of topics in a long meeting. He was impressed with the Pope and with the reception at the Vatican.
PAGE 3
The President in summing up his trip to Europe, said the total trip signifies the forward movement and momentum of American foreign policy. In spite of the problems with Vietnam and all of Southeast Asia, the United States will stand firmly by its Allies; it will maintain its commitments, and American foreign policy will be strong and bold in future years.
The President then asked Henry if he cared to make any comments.
Secretary Kissinger said that when the United States first proposed a NATO Meeting, the Allies were not enthusiastic about it. It came at a very difficult time for the United States and no one in NATO was particularly excited about having a meeting.
There was a discussion as to whether or not the United States should take new and creative measures, even some gimmickry in getting this group together. The final decision was made by the President, when he said he wanted to have a straight forward meeting with NATO with no ploy or gimmicks. Secretary Kissinger's belief was that the major point the President made at NATO is that the U. S. is back in business. The United States knew what it was doing, had a firm commitment, and showed clear direction in its discussion with other countries.
An example of the kind of impression left was best summed up by Prime Minister Trudeau of Canada. Trudeau told others at one of the closing sessions, that the meeting was so good and so beneficial, that it should be institutionalized. He indicated that NATO should cover the entire agenda of issues before world countries as opposed to just defense. Since Canada has been a rather reluctant partner in NATO from time to time, it is interesting that he should be so enthusiastic.
The Secretary noted that the framework was created at Brussels for a good discussion with regard to Turkey and Greece. The real cog seems to be who will put forth the first proposition, since it will then seem that party is making the concession. So the policy seems to be at a point where one country or the other will put forth a major proposal.
The Secretary said that the only political party in Portugal is the military. The others for all intents and purposes were dead. His basic question about Portugal is why do they stay in NATO, and there seems to be two answers: 1) Because the public is not ready to accept the fact that they might pull out, and 2) Perhaps they are staying in to serve the Communist purpose.
PAGE 4
The big problem in Spain, of course, is how influential can the United States be in keeping Spain from going like Portugal when Franco dies. Therefore, the President met with Franco, as well as Juan Carlos and Arias to be certain the United States was clearly identified with the transitional power and the succession of Franco. (...)
Cabinet Meeting Minutes, 6/4/75, Box 4, James E. Connor Files, Gerald R. Ford Library.
Sunday, January 06, 2013
Callaghan evitou envolver soviéticos na crise de março
Mais um “papel” dos arquivos britânicos. São as conclusões de mais uma reunião do conselho de ministros que começou às 09:30
de 25 de março de 1975, no n.º 10 de Downing Street, em Londres. Por essa altura, andava Portugal às voltas com uma revolução, já passara o “11
de março”, as ruas estavam tomadas por militares barbudos e esquerdistas.
O chefe da diplomacia britânico,
James Callaghan, alertava que a situação portuguesa era “confusa e potencialmente perigosa”.
O MFA é “imprevisível” e os acontecimentos dos “últimos dias” - o golpe de 11 de março - significam “mais
um passo no estabelecimento de um regime totalitário controlado pelos comunistas”, com o eventual
apoio dos soviéticos.
A inquietação - ou será pânico? - parece ter tomado conta dos países
aliados da NATO. Londres opusera-se a que os embaixadores da URSS nas capitais
dos países da Aliança Atlântica fossem “chamados de imediato” para audiências,
presumivelmente pelos responsáveis da diplomacia. Callaghan receava que esse ato
fosse entendido como “uma ingerência” na formação do Governo em Lisboa e em que
os aliados não queriam comunistas.
A decisão de Londres foi dar instruções
ao embaixador em Lisboa para transmitir ao Presidente Costa Gomes a importância
de o novo regime manter as eleições para a Assembleia Constituinte, a 25 de abril, dando
garantias de serem disputadas numa “atmosfera de estabilidade e equilíbrio”.
(Foto
Central Press/Getty Images)
Tuesday, January 01, 2013
… a “dr Soares” em 24 de julho de 1975
Passa mais de um ano sobre a primeira análise ao golpe em Lisboa. À mesma mesa de Downing Street, a 24 de julho de 1975, voltam a sentar-se Harold Wilson, James Callaghan. Portugal está na agenda. Em Londres e não só; também em Paris, Washington, Pequim, Moscovo. O cenário era muito diferente de maio de 1974. Há uma revolução vermelha nas ruas de Lisboa.
Os britânicos olhavam a situação “confusa” de Portugal, com Soares a querer derrubar o Governo de Vasco Gonçalves; havia o risco de um golpe de Estado da parte do PCP e da esquerda militar, concluíam eles.
A poucos dias da Cimeira de Helsínquia, Wilson planeava falar, juntamente com o presidente da França, Giscard d’Estaing, ao líder soviético, Leonid Brejnev, sobre Portugal e os riscos, para a política de “detente”, de um envolvimento da URSS nos acontecimentos em Portugal.
“Não havia dúvidas de que a União Soviética estava a fornecer fundos substanciais ao Partido Comunista Português, então o sr. Brejnev tem o poder, ainda que parcialmente, para controlar a situação, como prova de empenhamento na ‘detente ‘”, lê-se na ata da reunião de ministros britânicos*.
Nos arquivos norte-americanos há, também, documentos a atestar este plano de Wilson e Giscard. E até um telegrama do Departamento de Estado norte-americano a relatar que Brezhnev terá dito que ia analisar o pedido…
Harold Wilson era um dos líderes europeus que tinha planeado estar presente num encontro de solidariedade da Internacional Socialista com Portugal, em Estocolmo. Mário Soares era agora uma das figuras centrais da política portuguesa contra o avanço “vermelho” em Portugal. Em Estocolmo, lá estiveram Willy Brandt, Olof Palme, François Miterrand e Yitzak Rabin.
Na ata, Soares já não era o “senhor Soares”, mas sim “dr. Soares”…
*Consultar este link; para descarregar o documento, faça
duplo click em “download full document”:
http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/SearchUI/image/Index/C9298631?isFullDescription=FalseLondres, 02 de maio de 1974: De “Senhor Soares”…
Tinha passado apenas uma semana desde a queda da ditadura de Marcelo
Caetano, a 25 de abril de 1974. Harold Wilson era
primeiro-ministro no Reino Unido. No número 10 de Downing Street, em Londres, é
feita uma primeira análise do golpe (para já era um golpe). Há dois nomes que
aparecem na ata da reunião desse dia: o “senhor Soares” e o “general Spínola”.
A ata da reunião do governo britânico é de 02 de maio de 1974 e a
posição sobre Portugal é descrita pelo ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros,
James Callaghan, mais tarde um aliado de Soares nos meses loucos da revolução. Para
já, Londres ia reconhecer o “novo regime”. António de Spínola, presidente da
Junta de Salvação Nacional, era tido como alguém que conseguiu manter a
situação estável em Lisboa. No texto da ata (ver página oito do documento na página dos National Archives*) são curiosas as informações relatadas: sobre a visita de Soares a Londres, como “emissário de Spinola”, e o desejo dos comunistas de participarem no Governo saído do 25 de abril.
Pode não parecer novidade, mas Mário Soares também tem uma confissão, no relato feito por Callaghan: a ambição de ser primeiro-ministro.
Apesar dos “grandes problemas” que Portugal vai enfrentar na transição de um “Estado totalitário para uma democracia”, Callaghan dizia acreditar que estava criada “uma oportunidade” para os portugueses.
Problemático era o dossier da descolonização – primeiro tema de fricção entre os militares do MFA e Spínola. Pela ata percebe-se que “o novo regime” acolheria de bom grado conselhos sobre o tema vindos de Londres...
Curiosa é a forma como Soares, secretário-geral do PS, era tratado na ata: “Senhor Soares”. Assim mesmo, com “n” e “h”. Um ano depois, já seria diferente.
*Consultar este link; para descarregar o documento, faça duplo click em
“download full document”:
(Foto: Fundação Mário Soares)
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